The 2004 European Union enlargement resulted in an unprecedented wave of 1.5 million workers relocating from Eastern Europe to the UK. We study the links between this migrant inflow and life satisfaction of native residents in England and Wales. Combining the British Household Panel Survey with the Local Authority level administrative data from the Worker Registration Scheme, we find that higher levels of local immigration were associated with a decrease in life satisfaction among older, unemployed and lower-income people, and with an increase in life satisfaction among younger, employed, higher-income and better educated people. These findings are driven by the initial 'migration shock' -the inflows that occurred in the first two years after the enlargement. Overall, our study highlights the importance of local-level immigration in shaping the life satisfaction of receiving populations. We also argue that our results help explain the socio-demographic patterns observed in the UK Brexit vote.
Introduction
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held a historic referendum in which citizens voted, 52% to 48%, to leave the European Union (EU). The outcome of this vote has sent shockwaves around the world and is likely to change the course of British and European politics for years to come. It is widely recognized that immigration played a major role in the decision of the UK to leave the EU: immigration was a dominant theme in the prereferendum debate and remains a key issue as the UK prepares its exit from the bloc (GietelBasten, 2016; Alfano et al., 2016) . Specifically, the proponents of Brexit argued that the levels of immigration to the UK from other EU countries have become too high; exiting the EU would enable the country to control immigration from the EU. Slogans such as 'immigrants take our jobs' and 'take back control of our borders' have resonated well with the UK general public, for whom immigration has indeed become one of the biggest worries (The Economist, 2015) .
However, for some time scholars have been pointing that immigration has few, if any, adverse effects on the labor markets of migrant-receiving countries (Constant, 2014; Peri, 2014) . Such findings, coupled with mounting worries over immigration levels, raise a question: in what ways does immigration affect the well-being of people in migrant-receiving countries -beyond the realm of the labor markets? In this paper, we explore the effects of immigration on the subjective well-being of local residents -a relationship that has so far received little attention in both the literature and public debate.
There are several reasons why it is important to study the effects of immigration on subjective well-being. First, subjective well-being, captured often (but not exclusively) by life satisfaction and happiness, is a more integrated representation of individual utility and can reflect a broad range of real and perceived effects of immigration on individual welfare. This argument is in line with the increasing acceptance, in both academic and policy circles, of subjective well-being as a key variable to measure individual welfare and societal progress, and guide policymaking (OECD, 2013 ; Office for National Statistics, 2013; Sgroi et al., 2017) . Second, it has been shown that higher levels of subjective well-being have objective benefits: happier and more life-satisfied people are healthier, more productive and creative (De Neve et al., 2013; Oswald et al., 2015) ; this means that happy people are an asset for society and it is crucial to understand whether factors such as immigration increase or reduce happiness. Third, the politicians' prospects of being re-elected may depend directly on how happy the voters are (Liberini et al., 2017; Ward, 2015) . Politicians willing to get re-elected may, therefore, be interested in how immigration affects voters' subjective well-being.
To answer our research question -whether immigration affects the subjective wellbeing of residents in a host country -we focus on a recent immigration wave to the UK. Following the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, the UK opened its labor market to citizens of the new EU member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia -also known as the accession or A8 countries). The resulting migrant inflow was the "biggest peacetime movement [ It has been shown that this unexpectedly large inflow of A8 migrants had no adverse effect on either UK wages or unemployment (Gilpin et al., 2006; Lemos and Portes, 2013; Lemos, 2014) . 3 However, it has also been claimed that A8 immigrants have disadvantaged the UK's low-skilled and young workers (Sumption and Somerville, 2010; MigrationWatch, 2012) , strained the provision of local public services 4 as well as been subject to exploitation and unfair treatment (Jayaweera and Anderson, 2008; BBC, 2013) . These reports, even if not always generalizable to the whole A8 migrant population, have received wide media coverage. Coupled with the extent of the A8 migration and the frustration over the EU internal labor mobility rules, they have contributed to the rising anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment in the UK, fueled support for the far-right political parties (Geddes, 2014; Lawless, 2015) and, ultimately, Brexit. (Brücker and Damelang, 2009) . 3 It has also been shown that A8 migration contributed to the UK public finances (Dustmann et al., 2010) and may have reduced crime (Bell et al., 2013) .
We believe that the 2004 enlargement and the ensuing migrant inflows to the UK represent an instructive laboratory for the examination of the effects of immigration on the subjective well-being of local residents. Due to the sheer contribution of the new member states to the EU population (it increased by 20%) and the fact that only three countries -the UK, Ireland and Sweden -opened their borders to the new Europeans immediately upon accession, the 2004 enlargement has often been considered a natural experiment (Constant, 2012; Elsner, 2013; Lemos and Portes, 2013, Kahanec et al., 2016) . 5 In the context of our study, it is, for example, highly unlikely that the large and fast inflows of East Europeans were driven by the subjective well-being (or their expected change) of the UK residents; in other words, we can by and large exclude the possibility of reverse causality -one potential source of endogeneity.
Besides being fast and unexpectedly large, the A8 migration to the UK was also geographically unevenly distributed (Figure 1 ). The demand for jobs in the geographicallyconcentrated, 'migrant-intensive' industries, such as agriculture, food processing and manufacturing, meant that that some UK communities were affected by the East European migration much more than others. Our identification strategy relies on this uneven geographical distribution of A8 immigration. In particular, we relate the local-level intensity of A8 migration to the changes in people's life satisfaction over time. To capture the locallevel migration intensity, we use data from the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), which documented, between 2004 and 2011, the number of A8 workers starting a job in the UK at the local authority level. To capture changes in individual life satisfaction, we use the British 5 Lemos and Portes (2013: 299) argue that the post-enlargement immigration to the UK "corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks studied in the literature".
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Since the BHPS follows the same people over time, we can estimate fixed effects regression models that take account of the potentially confounding impact of time-invariant individual characteristics. Our paper contributes to the nascent literature on the effects of immigration and diversity on the subjective well-being of native populations (Betz and Simpson, 2013; Longhi, 2014; Akay at al., 2014; Akay et al., 2017) , the detailed review of which we provide in the next section, as well as to the broader, rapidly growing literature on subjective well-being and migration. 6 We also add to the literature studying the relative importance of individual and 6 See Simpson (2013) for an overview, Ivlevs (2015) for a review of the effects of subjective well-being on the emigration decision, Nikolova and Graham (2015) for a review of the effects of international migration on regional variation in subjective well-being, as well as the regional and local-level determinants of it. While some studies have found that, after controlling for individual-level factors, the role of geography in explaining well-being is limited (Ballas and Tranmer, 2012) , others have found that the regional dimension matters (Aslam and Corrado, 2012; Pittau et al., 2010; Pierewan and Tampubolon, 2014) and that contextual characteristics, such as the neighborhood levels of social support and socio-economic deprivation, can be important determinants of subjective well-being (Shields et al., 2009; Howley et al., 2015; Tselios at al., 2015) . Our findings support the importance of the regional dimension in explaining subjective well-being and suggest that local-level immigration inflows are an important predictor of the changes in individual life satisfaction.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and outlines the channels through which immigration may affect the subjective well-being of receiving populations. Section 3 presents the data and estimation approach. Section 4 reports the results, while section 5 discusses them in more detail and concludes.
2. Immigration and subjective well-being: related literature and conceptual channels migrants' subjective well-being, and Nowok et al. (2013) and Iammarino and Marinelli (2011) for the effect of internal migration on migrants' well-being.
Our study is most closely related to the nascent literature on the effects of immigration and diversity on the subjective well-being of receiving populations. This subsection provides a brief overview of its main extant contributions. Betz and Simpson (2013) Importantly, the results are driven by the younger and mid-age respondent groups, while no statistically significant relationship between immigrant diversity and subjective wellbeing is found for older respondents (age 50+).
Our study adopts a methodology similar to Akay et al. (2014) and Akay et al. (2017) , although we exploit a more disaggregated spatial variation in immigration rates (320 local authority districts of England and Wales) and concentrate on the effects on life satisfaction of a specific migration wave (A8 migration). We hypothesise that the A8 immigration may have affected the subjective well-being of UK residents through a number of channels: by increasing concerns about labour market competition and provision of public services (note that, even in the absence of real effects, people may still think immigration is harmful) and disrupting local ways of life through increased diversity.
We are also interested in how immigration affects life satisfaction of different groups of people, such as younger and older residents, the employed and unemployed, as well as people with lower and higher levels of education and income. One reason to focus on different subgroups is that immigration may affect their well-being differently. For example, one could argue that younger and more educated people are more supportive of diversity, which is brought along by immigration, while the unemployed are more concerned about labor market competition and older people about the effects of immigration on the provision of public services (for example, health services). Another reason to focus on subgroups is the demographic composition of the Brexit referendum vote. It has been shown, for example, that older and less educated voters in particular were more likely to vote 'Leave' (Becker et al., 2016; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Rosenbaum, 2017) and, relative to their younger counterparts, older people place a higher importance on the issue of immigration as the UK negotiates its way out of the EU (Bulman, 2017) . Our findings will show whether immigration-induced changes in subjective well-being are congruent with these voting and policy preference patterns. Finally, studying how life satisfaction responds to immigration across demographic groups is policy relevant because some groups, such as the elderly, are more likely to vote and may thus have a greater say over the formation of immigration policy.
Data and methods

BHPS and life satisfaction
The individual-level data used in the empirical analysis are from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) -a nationally representative survey of the adult population (16+) of more than 5,000 households (containing approximately 10,000 individuals) in Great Britain, sampled in 1991 and followed annually until 2008/2009. 7 The BHPS contains individual and household-level information on demographic characteristics, income, education and training, employment, as well as values and opinions on social and political matters. Importantly for our study, a series of questions on health and subjective well-being are also included in the survey.
Information on life satisfaction was collected during BHPS waves 6-10 (1996-2000) and 12-18 (2002-2008/2009 ). In particular, individuals were asked to record on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 'not satisfied at all' to 'completely satisfied', how dissatisfied or satisfied they are with their life overall. The answers to this question form the dependent variable in our analysis.
Worker Registration Scheme and local migrant flows
The Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), in operation between May 2004 and April 2011, was introduced by the British Government to monitor the inflows of the nationals of the eight East European states which joined the EU in 2004. Workers had to register for their first job taken in the UK (if working for more than one month), and re-register if they changed employer within the first 12 months; no further registration was necessary after one year of uninterrupted employment in the UK. The registration fee for the first job was £50
(eventually rising to £90), while re-registrations were free. The self-employed were exempt from registering. The results were very similar to the ones reported in this paper. This provides us with further confidence that the WRS data are a good proxy for the actual inflows of A8 immigrants.
Third, migrants did not have to de-register when they stopped working -the data thus reflect migrant inflows rather than net migration. This, however, is not necessarily an issue for our study, as it can be argued that it is the inflow rate of new migrants that matters for the life satisfaction of receiving populations -regardless of whether migrants become permanent or not. Finally, to avoid double counting, the data refer only to first migrant registrations (Bauere et al., 2007) ; they, therefore, cannot capture migrants' spatial mobility. However, Bell et al. (2013) find that there is a very close correlation between the WRS registrations and the changes in corresponding migrant stocks across the (more aggregated) Police Force Areas, implying a limited spatial mobility of migrants.
Estimation strategy
The baseline linear regression model explaining life satisfaction (LS) for individual i in local authority district (LAD) j at year t can be expressed as follows:
where MIR is the migrant inflow rate at the LAD level, Z is a vector of LAD-level control We control for time-invariant spatial heterogeneity with the insertion of a full set of 320 LAD dummies. To account for time-varying LAD characteristics, which might be related to both life satisfaction and migrant inflows, we include the LAD-level job claimant rate, the crime rate, the rate of migrant registrations with general health practitioners (GPs) (total job claimants, total crime count, and migrant registrations with GPs, all as a proportion of LAD 10 Note that in our case it is not possible to cluster standard errors at the LAD level. This is because our panel dimension is the individual, and individuals can change LADs over time. We have experimented with a sample of non-movers, which allows for clustering at the LAD level, and found very similar results from either clustering option. population), the log of median house price, and the log of median gross annual salary by LAD. 11 Crime, house prices, and salary data are only available for England and Wales, so our final sample excludes respondents interviewed in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 12 All specifications also include a set of standard socio-demographic controls: log of household monthly income, labor market status, subjective general health status, marital status, number of children, household size, housing tenure and highest education level attained. Finally, all year-specific influences on life satisfaction are captured by year dummies.
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We proceed by presenting our baseline estimates for three time periods: the whole period 
Results
Baseline estimates
We start our analysis by estimating the baseline model for the three time periods: 2003-2008, 2003-2005 and 2006-2008. Estimates from two specifications for each period, the first without the LAD-level controls and the second including them, are presented in Table 1 . On average, there is no significant relationship between local migrant inflows and the life 14 Age can only be inserted in the model through its interaction term. Its direct effect on life satisfaction cannot be identified in a fixed effects model that includes year dummies, since its change is constant across time for all persons (Wooldridge, 2006: 489) . Note also that we experimented with specifications where all the relevant interaction terms were simultaneously inserted in the model. This did not prove to be a very helpful exercise since no variables of interest reached statistical significance, pointing to a largely demanding model with very high collinearities among the interaction terms. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results presented in the following sections.
satisfaction of UK nationals. All LAD-level controls, in the model specifications that include them (2, 4 and 6), are also statistically insignificant. Importantly, their inclusion does not seem to substantially affect the estimate for the coefficient of our variable of interest, the migrant inflow rate. We also note that the results for the coefficients of the control variables are broadly consistent with the findings reported in the related literature (e.g. Akay et al. 2014 ): married or cohabiting individuals are more satisfied with their lives than similar never married or widowed/divorced/separated ones, the unemployed report significantly lower satisfaction than the employed or the inactive, while worse levels of health are also associated with much lower life satisfaction.
[ Table 1 about here]
Interactions
A different picture emerges when the interaction terms between the migrant inflow rate and various individual-level characteristics are entered into the model (Table 2) Table 2 ). This makes intuitive sense, since a large change in migration, like the one that took place between 2003 and 2005, is generally needed for an effect to be more accurately identified.
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[ Table 2 "excellent" (the highest health category) to "very poor" (the lowest health category) is estimated to expect a reduction of around half its standard deviation in her well-being, ceteris paribus. Figure 2) . Having said that, we remain quite cautious about putting too much weight on the estimates of the income and education interaction terms because of their relatively low levels of significance (10%).
Further checks 16
To examine the robustness of our results, we first estimate a variant of the fixed effects regressions presented in Table 2 (for the 2003-2008 and 2003-2005 . 17 We do this to ensure that our results are not driven by the way life satisfaction data were reported and recorded in a particular year (2003) . The findings are very similar to the ones presented in Table 2 , although the estimated coefficients for the migrant inflow rate and its interaction terms are generally smaller in (absolute) size.
Second, we have used an alternative measure to capture subjective well-being -an index of psychological health, derived from the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). 18 Both the migrant inflow rate and its interactions are statistically insignificant in all specifications of Table 2 when life satisfaction is replaced with this GHQ index as the dependent variable in the models. A plausible explanation is that life satisfaction and the GHQ index are not comparable measures. The GHQ index is closely related to mental health issues, while life satisfaction is a broader measure of individual well-being.
Discussion and conclusion
17 2001 is omitted since the life satisfaction question was not asked in that year. 18 The GHQ in BHPS has 12 question items with possible answers ranging from 1 to 4, each corresponding to (increasing) frequencies of feelings related to psychological health. Hence, the final measure ranges from 12 to 48, with higher values corresponding to worse health. We reverse the measure so that it increases in good health. See Table 4A while the life satisfaction of people with low incomes decreased with it. All these abovementioned associations were pronounced in the 'migration shock' period -the first two years after the UK opened its labor market to the new Europeans -and became statistically insignificant in the longer term.
How can one explain these results? A positive association between immigration and life satisfaction for the young could be because young people are in favor of diversity brought about by immigration. In contrast, older people might be particularly opposed to diversity and change, as well as be concerned with the (perceived) pressure immigrants put on local health services; this could explain why the elderly become less life-satisfied when larger immigrant inflows take place. Overall, the age group differences corroborate a finding from the literature on attitudes towards immigration that old people are more opposed to immigration than young people (Mayda, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Malcow-Møller et al., 2008). 19 It is thus likely that people's attitudes towards immigration, possibly strengthened by actual encounters with immigrants, feed into life satisfaction.
The negative association between the local immigration rate and life satisfaction among the unemployed could mean that people in this group feel that their chances of getting back to work and their labour market bargaining power get weaker with higher levels of immigration -a form of labour market competition. At the same time, those in employment do not seem to be threatened by labour market competition, as their life satisfaction increases with the levels of local immigration. This is consistent with the evidence that the post-enlargement immigration did not have adverse effects on UK wages and unemployment (Gilpin et al., 2006; Lemos and Portes, 2013; Lemos, 2014) , as well as the evidence that natives move to other, potentially more desirable, types of jobs (such as communication-intensive jobs) as immigrants come in (Peri, 2014) . The negative association between the local immigration rate and life satisfaction among the economically inactive echoes the negative association between the two variables among the elderly: the latter are retired and less likely to 19 Unfortunately, the BHPS does not contain information on individual attitudes towards immigration and we are unable to test whether the negative relationship between age and pro-immigration attitudes holds in our case.
participate in the labour force, while the largest part (around 60%) of inactive people in our sample consists of retired people.
The finding that life satisfaction increases with local-level immigration among those with high incomes and relatively high levels of education, even if of weaker significance than the age and employment status interactions, could indicate that these groups do not perceive Eastern European migrants as labour market competitors (which is consistent with the fact that the A8 migrants are concentrated in low-skilled sectors/occupations). Instead, the wealthier and better educated could be gaining in life satisfaction through, for example, enhanced social life (many A8 migrants are employed in the hospitality industry, keeping its product prices low) or satisfaction with house or family life (A8 migrants increased the supply of cheap household services). These conjectures echo the results by Akay et al. (2014) , who show that immigration increases satisfaction with dwelling among respondents in Germany.
Overall, the results of our paper suggest that immigration does not affect the well-being of different groups of people in the same way and that labour market considerations are unlikely to be a dominant factor in explaining the links between immigration and natives' well-being.
In addition, the fact that the life satisfaction of particular groups, such as the elderly, decreases with immigration has implications for the formation of immigration policy in most developed immigration-receiving countries, where populations are aging and older people are generally more likely to vote (Melo and Stockemer, 2014) . From this perspective, the recent decision of the UK to leave the EU could well be explained by the negative association between A8 immigration and the life satisfaction of older people in the UK. This contention, however, hinges on the assumptions that 1) the Brexit referendum vote was indeed largely about restricting immigration, and 2) life satisfaction affects people's immigration policy preferences. The second assumption, in particular, has received little attention in the literature and, as such, represents a fruitful avenue for future research. 
